

Maximal α -Leakage for Quantum Privacy Mechanisms and Operational Meaning of Measured Rényi Capacity

(arXiv: 2403.14450)

Bo-Yu Yang, Hsuan Yu, and Hao-Chung Cheng

National Taiwan University


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Information Leakage


In the era Internet of Things (IoT), data may be published or shared via **privacy mechanisms** everywhere.

- social network, online data sharing, mobile computing



How much information does a **quantum system** B leak about S ?

Quantum Systems




The adversary's goal: to **infer** data X from observation B (classical Y) with estimation \hat{X}

⇒ How much information does the adversary gain/lose?

- Classical system: prob. distr. ⇒ $p_{Y|X=x}(y) \geq 0$, $\sum_y p_{Y|X=x}(y) = 1$
- Quantum system: density matrix ⇒ $\rho_B^x \geq 0$, $\text{Tr}[\rho_B^x] = 1$
 - $\rho_B^x = \sum_y \lambda_y^{X=x} |\psi_y\rangle\langle\psi_y|$, where $\lambda_y^{X=x} \geq 0$, $\sum_y \lambda_y^{X=x} = 1$

Quantum Privacy Mechanisms



	classical Y	quantum B
privacy mechanism	$\mathcal{N}_{X \rightarrow Y} : x \mapsto p_{Y X=x}$	$\mathcal{N}_{X \rightarrow B} : x \mapsto \rho_B^x$
adversary	$p_{\hat{X} Y}$	Π_{XB} (POVM)

- **Positive Operator-Valued Measure (POVM)**

$$\Pi_{XB} := \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes \Pi_B^x \text{ s.t. } \Pi_B^x \geq 0 \text{ and } \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \Pi_B^x = \mathbf{1}_B$$

- Born's rule: $\Pr\{\hat{X} = X \mid X = x, B\} = \text{Tr}[\rho_B^x \Pi_B^x]$
- can be viewed as quantum generalization of classical strategies

Parameterized Gain/Loss Functions (1/2)

We propose

- Minimal expected α -loss

$$\varepsilon_{\alpha}(X|B)_{\rho} := \inf_{\text{POVM } \Pi_{XB}} \frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1} \left(1 - \text{Tr} \left[\rho_{XB} \Pi_{XB}^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} \right] \right)$$


- Maximal expected α -gain

$$P_{\alpha}(X|B)_{\rho} := \sup_{\text{POVM } \{\Pi_B^x\}_{x \in \mathcal{X}}} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} p_X(x) \text{Tr} \left[\rho_B^x (\Pi_B^x)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} \right]$$

- To minimize loss = To maximize gain

$$P_{\alpha}(X|B)_{\rho} = 1 - \frac{\alpha - 1}{\alpha} \varepsilon_{\alpha}(X|B)_{\rho}$$

Parameterized Gain/Loss Functions (2/2)



Expected [...]	classical Y [Liao'19] ¹	quantum B (our work)
0-1 loss ($\alpha = \infty$)	$1 - \mathbb{E}_{X,Y} [p_{\hat{X} Y}]$	$1 - \text{Tr} [\rho_{XB} \Pi_{XB}]$
log loss ($\alpha = 1$)	$-\mathbb{E}_{X,Y} [\log p_{\hat{X} Y}]$	$-\text{Tr} [\rho_{XB} \log \Pi_{XB}]$
α -loss ($\alpha \in [1, \infty]$)	$\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1} \left(1 - \mathbb{E}_{X,Y} \left[p_{\hat{X} Y}^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} \right] \right)$	$\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1} \left(1 - \text{Tr} \left[\rho_{XB} \Pi_{XB}^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} \right] \right)$

- 0-1 loss: probability of incorrectly guessing
- log loss: uncertainty of the strategy
- α -loss: tunable function for various adversarial strategies

¹J. Liao, O. Kosut, L. Sankar, and F. du Pin Calmon. Tunable measures for information leakage and applications to privacy-utility tradeoffs. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory. 2019.

Existing Results

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 55, NO. 9, SEPTEMBER 2009

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The Operational Meaning of Min- and Max-Entropy

Robert König, Renato Renner, and Christian Schaffner

For $\alpha = \infty$, the error exponent of maximal expected ∞ -gain is reduced to the so-called **min-entropy** (guessing entropy) introduced by [König-Renner-Schaffner'09]

$$-\log P_\infty(X|B)_\rho = H_\infty^*(X|B)_\rho := - \inf_{\sigma_B \in \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_B)} D_\infty^*(\rho_{XB} \| \mathbb{1}_X \otimes \sigma_B).$$

- Maximal probability of correctly guessing:

$$P_\infty(X|B)_\rho := \sup_{\text{POVM } \{\Pi_B^x\}_{x \in \mathcal{X}}} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} p_X(x) \text{Tr}[\rho_B^x (\Pi_B^x)]$$


Characterization 1: Maximal Expected α -Gain

Theorem

For any classical-quantum state ρ_{XB} and $\alpha \in [1, \infty]$, the maximal expected α -gain is given by

$$P_\alpha(X|B)_\rho = e^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} H_\alpha^M(X|B)_\rho}.$$


- Measured conditional Rényi entropy [Hanson et al.'20]²:
 $H_\alpha^M(X|B)_\rho := -\inf_{\sigma_B} D_\alpha^M(\rho_{XB} \| \mathbb{1}_X \otimes \sigma_B)$
- Variational formula of measured Rényi divergence:
 $D_\alpha^M(\rho \| \sigma) := \sup_{\omega > 0} \frac{1}{\alpha-1} \log \left(\left(\text{Tr} \left[\rho \omega^{1-\frac{1}{\alpha}} \right] \right)^\alpha (\text{Tr} [\sigma \omega])^{1-\alpha} \right)$
- Proof sketch: transform the condition of POVM in $P_\alpha(X|B)_\rho$ into Lagrange multiplier (penalty terms), and leverage duality

²E. P. Hanson, V. Katariya, N. Datta and M. M. Wilde. Guesswork with Quantum Side Information: Optimal Strategies and Aspects of Security. IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, 2020. 

① Introduction

② Information Leakage Measures

③ Conclusion

Information Leakage Measure: α -Leakage

The α -leakage is defined as

$$\mathcal{L}_\alpha(X \rightarrow B)_\rho := \frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1} \log \frac{P_\alpha(X|B)_\rho}{P_\alpha(X)_\rho}.$$

- maximal expected α -gain **after** observing B
 $P_\alpha(X|B)_\rho := \sup_{\text{POVM}} \{\Pi_B^x\}_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} p_X(x) \text{Tr} \left[\rho_B^x (\Pi_B^x)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} \right]$
- max-expected α -gain for an inference \hat{X} **before** observing B :
 $P_\alpha(X)_\rho := \sup_{p_{\hat{X}}: \hat{X} \perp X} \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_X} \left[\Pr(\hat{X} = X | X = x)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} \right]$
- depict the **multiplicative increase** of the adversary's knowledge

Characterization 2: α -Leakage

Theorem

For $\alpha \in [1, \infty]$, α -leakage can be expressed as

$$\mathcal{L}_\alpha(X \rightarrow B)_\rho = I_\alpha^{\text{A}, \text{M}}(X : B)_\rho.$$

Proof sketch:


- α -Leakage:

$$\mathcal{L}_\alpha(X \rightarrow B)_\rho := \frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1} \log P_\alpha(X|B)_\rho - \frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1} \log P_\alpha(X)_\rho$$

- Measured Arimoto information:

$$I_\alpha^{\text{A}, \text{M}}(X : B)_\rho := (-H_\alpha^{\text{M}}(X|B)_\rho) - (-H_\alpha(X)_\rho)$$

Information Leakage Measure: Maximal α -Leakage



Let S be any function of X . The maximal α -leakage is defined as

$$\mathcal{L}_\alpha^{\max}(X \rightarrow B)_\rho := \sup_{p_{S|X}: S-X-B} \mathcal{L}_\alpha(S \rightarrow B)_\rho.$$

Characterization 3: Maximal α -Leakage

Theorem

For $\alpha \in [1, \infty]$, the maximal α -leakage can be expressed as

$$\mathcal{L}_\alpha^{\max}(X \rightarrow B)_\rho = \begin{cases} C_\alpha^{\mathbf{M}}(\mathcal{N}_{\text{supp}(p_X) \rightarrow B}) = R_\alpha^{\mathbf{M}}(\mathcal{N}_{\text{supp}(p_X) \rightarrow B}), & \alpha > 1; \\ I_1^{\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{M}}(X : B)_\rho = \mathcal{L}_1(X \rightarrow B)_\rho, & \alpha = 1. \end{cases}$$


- **Measured Rényi capacity:** $C_\alpha^{\mathbf{M}}(\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{X} \rightarrow B}) := \sup_{p_X} I_\alpha^{\mathbf{M}}(X : B)_\rho$
- **Measured Rényi divergence radius**
 $R_\alpha^{\mathbf{M}}(\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{X} \rightarrow B}) := \inf_{\sigma_B} \sup_{x \in \mathcal{X}} D_\alpha^{\mathbf{M}}(\mathcal{N}(x) \| \sigma_B) \equiv \inf_{\sigma_B} \sup_{x \in \mathcal{X}} D_\alpha^{\mathbf{M}}(\rho_B^x \| \sigma_B)$
- **Measured Rényi information:** $I_\alpha^{\mathbf{M}}(X : B)_\rho := \inf_{\sigma_B} D_\alpha^{\mathbf{M}}(\rho_{XB} \| \rho_X \otimes \sigma_B)$
- For $\alpha > 1$, $\mathcal{L}_\alpha^{\max}(X \rightarrow B)_\rho$ only depends on X through its support.

Properties of Maximal α -Leakage (1/2)

$$\mathcal{L}_\alpha^{\max}(X \rightarrow B)_\rho = \begin{cases} \sup_{\bar{p}_X \in \mathcal{P}(\text{supp}(p_X))} \inf_{\sigma_B \in \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_B)} D_\alpha^{\text{M}}(\bar{\rho}_{XB} \| \bar{p}_X \otimes \sigma_B), & \alpha > 1; \\ I_1^{\text{A,M}}(X : B)_\rho, & \alpha = 1. \end{cases}$$

- concave program of \bar{p}_X ; concave function of input p_X
- quasi-convex in ρ_B^x given \bar{p}_X or p_X
- non-decreasing in α
- satisfies data-processing inequality (DPI)
- upper bound and lower bound:

$$0 \leq \mathcal{L}_\alpha^{\max}(X \rightarrow B)_\rho \leq \begin{cases} \log(|\text{supp}(p_X)|), & \alpha > 1; \\ H_1(X)_p, & \alpha = 1. \end{cases}$$

Properties of Maximal α -Leakage: Composition Property (2/2)

- $B_1 - X - B_2$ form a Markov chain
- Quantum privacy mechanisms: $\mathcal{N}_{X \rightarrow B_1} : x \mapsto \rho_{B_1}^x$, $\mathcal{N}_{X \rightarrow B_2} : x \mapsto \rho_{B_2}^x$
- For $\alpha \in [1, \infty]$, if the adversary can access more than one released version B_1, B_2 of the non-sensitive data X

Theorem

$$\mathcal{L}_\alpha^{\max}(X \rightarrow B_1, B_2)_\rho \leq \mathcal{L}_\alpha^{\max}(X \rightarrow B_1)_\rho + \mathcal{L}_\alpha^{\max}(X \rightarrow B_2)_\rho$$

Asymptotic Behavior of Information Leakage

- So far, we discussed about \mathcal{L}_α and $\mathcal{L}_\alpha^{\max}$ under $\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{X} \rightarrow B}$ in the **one-shot** setting \Rightarrow what are their asymptotic behaviors?
- Adversary: cannot be restricted to attack in the i.i.d. sense
- System designer: arguably easier to employ i.i.d. quantum privacy mechanisms

$$\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{X} \rightarrow B}^{\otimes n} : x_1 x_2 \cdots x_n \mapsto \rho_{B_1}^{x_1} \otimes \rho_{B_2}^{x_2} \otimes \cdots \otimes \rho_{B_n}^{x_n} =: \rho_{B^n}^{x^n}.$$

- **Regularization:** average information leakage as $n \rightarrow \infty$

Characterization 4: Regularized α -Leakage

Theorem

Let $\rho_{XB} = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} p_X(x) |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes \rho_B^x$. For $\alpha \geq 1$, then regularized α -leakage from i.i.d. X^n to B^n under $\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{X} \rightarrow B}^{\otimes n}$ is given by

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \mathcal{L}_\alpha(X^n \rightarrow B^n)_{\rho^{\otimes n}} = I_\alpha^*(X : B)_{\rho^{(\alpha)}}.$$

- Sandwiched Rényi information: $I_\alpha^*(X : B)_\rho := \inf_{\sigma_B} D_\alpha^*(\rho_{XB} \| \rho_X \otimes \sigma_B)$
- Denote $\rho_{XB}^{(\alpha)} \equiv \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} p_X^{(\alpha)}(x) |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes \rho_B^x$
- α -tilted distribution: $p_X^{(\alpha)}(x) := \frac{p_X(x)^\alpha}{\sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} p_X(x)^\alpha}$
- (Char. 2) $\mathcal{L}_\alpha(X \rightarrow B)_\rho = I_\alpha^{A, M}(X : B)_\rho \neq I_\alpha^M(X : B)_\rho$

Characterization 5: Regularized Maximal α -Leakage

Theorem


For any $\alpha > 1$, the regularized maximal α -leakage from X^n with any arbitrary distribution $p_{X^n} \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{X}^n)$ that has full support to B^n under $\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{X} \rightarrow B}^{\otimes n}$ is given by

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \mathcal{L}_\alpha^{\max}(X^n \rightarrow B^n)_{\rho^n} = C_\alpha^*(\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{X} \rightarrow B}) = R_\alpha^*(\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{X} \rightarrow B}).$$

- Sandwiched Rényi capacity: $C_\alpha^*(\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{X} \rightarrow B}) := \sup_{p_X \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{X})} I_\alpha^*(X : B)_\rho$
- Sandwiched Rényi divergence radius:
 $R_\alpha^*(\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{X} \rightarrow B}) := \inf_{\sigma_B} \sup_{x \in \mathcal{X}} D_\alpha^*(\mathcal{N}(x) \| \sigma_B) \equiv \inf_{\sigma_B} \sup_{x \in \mathcal{X}} D_\alpha^*(\rho_B^x \| \sigma_B)$
- Denote $\rho_{X^n B^n}^n := \sum_{x^n \in \mathcal{X}^n} p_{X^n}(x^n) |x^n\rangle \langle x^n| \otimes \rho_{B^n}^{x^n}$

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Takeaways



- $\mathcal{L}_\alpha^{\max}$ provided operational interpretation for measured Rényi capacity when $\alpha > 1$
- We characterized
 - one-shot: $P_\alpha(X|B)_\rho, \mathcal{L}_\alpha, \mathcal{L}_\alpha^{\max}$
 - asymptotic: $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \mathcal{L}_\alpha, \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \mathcal{L}_\alpha^{\max}$
- **Open problem:**
 - fully quantum case $S - A - B$?
 - Privacy-utility tradeoff (PUT)